Informal payments for health care are common in most former communist countries. This paper explores the demand side of these payments in Albania. Using tobit and Heckman selection models we control for individual determinants of informal payments in outpatient and inpatient health care. Propensity score matching techniques are used to investigate the changes in the characteristics of people paying informally over the different years. Our findings suggest that vulnerable groups in society remain less protected against such payments and policy measures have not reached the most deprived regions of the country.
I. Introduction
Informal payments for health care providers are widespread not only in the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also in other middle income and developing countries (Killingsworth, 1999; McPake et al., 1999; Lewis, 2000; Gaal et al., 2006; . They are usually defined as payments made to health care providers for services, which are supposed to be provided at no charge to the patient (Lewis, 2000) . Informal payments in health care can be conceptualized as strategies adopted by both the demand and supply side to cope with the lack of resources and poor performance of the health care system (Lewis, 2000; . Patients pay informally to jump the queue, receive higher quality of health services or more care (Lewis, 2000; Liaropoulos et al., 2008) . For providers of medical care, informal payments can turn into an instrument to supplement their low salaries or to satisfy the desire for a higher income (Liaropoulos and Tragakes, 1998) .
In countries like Albania informal payments to medical staff in the public health care sector have accompanied the transition from a central planned economy to a market economy. The existence and magnitude of such informal payments is often attributed to a mix of causal factors (Gaal and McKee, 2005; Tomini and Maarse, 2011) . Often the phenomenon is linked to the legacies of 'Semashko' systems formerly implemented in post-communist CEE and FSU countries (MCKee 1991) . The freely available services and the growing health care demand in the transition period are also considered as driving factors from this perspective (Gaal and McKee 2005) . Other causes are also believed to be the culture of expressing gratitude through gifts (Delcheva et al., 1997; Balabanova and McKee 2002) and the lack of resources (Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998; Ensor and Witter, 2001; Chawla et al., 1998) .
The presence of wide spread informal payments to medical staff is generally seen as an indicator of governance failure in the health sector (Lewis and Petterssen 2009) .
Governance failure in this case (condoning fraudulent behaviour) is closely linked with tolerance towards corruptive practices in other parts of society which are indicative for a lack of good governance. The general low probability of being detected or penalised when engaging in such practices contributes directly to the spread of informal payments. In some cases informal payments -although illegal -are condoned by governments that are unable to provide sufficient funding for health care providers.
A disputable topic regarding informal payments in health care is also that of the 'ultimate' remedy against these practices. Previous studies have argued that improving the remuneration mechanisms for medical staff, increasing providers' accountability and empowering patients' voice may be remedies against such phenomena (Lewis and Pettersson 2009) . Policy measures in the last years in Albania have addressed mainly the financing of primary care services and the compensation of general doctors. The impact that these measures have on informal payments is questionable. The persistence of informal payments (both inpatient and outpatient services) poses major questions both for the dynamics of the main causes over time but also on the effectiveness of the public measures against them. In this paper we use a propensity score matching (PSM) technique that allows for matching individuals over different cross-sectional surveys so that we can evaluate the effect that individual characteristics (like health insurance or other factors) have on the probability to pay informally.
The main aim of this paper is to test for the main motives behind informal payments in health care and to assess the effectiveness of various measures that have been implemented to reduce such informal payments over the last years in Albania. 
II. Informal payments and recent reforms in the health care sector in Albania
Albania, as most of the other ex-communist countries, has inherited a health care system based on the former Soviet 'Semashko' model. This system was designed to cover the entire country including every single village, following the communist ideology of "free health care services for all". The health sector during the communist period was underfinanced and considered as a non-productive sector (Nuri and Tragakes, 2002) . The funds allocated to the health sector were low and investments in health technology were even lower. The priority of the government in health care was mainly related to providing access to primary and secondary care. This led to a widely distributed web of primary health care (PHC) posts and centers and to a relatively large number of local and regional hospitals (most of which had outdated equipments and were overstaffed).
The Ministry of Health (MoH) in Albania (National Health Sector Strategy, 2004) has recognized that informal payments in health care are widespread both in inpatient and outpatient care. However the government has not succeeded to contain these informal payments so far. Little was done with regard to inpatient care (the contracting of such services from the HII will only be implemented in 2009-2010 and the effects are still to be seen). 
III. Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study come from Albania Living Standard Measurement certainly signaling that whatever measures were taken between years these were certainly not targeted to the poor (see Table 2 ). are the most heavily burdened by the payments (see Table 3 ). 
IV. Empirical strategy
The descriptive statics show clearly that certain characteristics of individuals (e.g. economic status) might be closely associated with the amounts paid. There are also distinct changes between the years and between consumption categories. In order to further explore this we look at how patients' characteristics influence informal payments during the years.
Determinants of informal payments
The Albanian LSMS it is not a panel survey so we have to rely on cross section analysis to determine the effect of individual characteristics on the amount paid informally to medical staff. In order to have an estimation of such determinants over the years and also compare the changes between the years we pool the data from ALSMS 2002 ALSMS , 2005 ALSMS and 2008 . The ALSMS allows this due to the identical questions asked over the years.
Our first goal is to get more insights in the individual characteristics that determine the amount paid informally. Not all patients who visited health care have reported informal payments to medical staff. Therefore we have a share of people reporting zero payments. We suspect this may be linked to two possible reasons: 1) the left censoring at zero, or 2) a possible selection problem.
As we are dealing here with informal payments in health care it is completely reasonable to imagine that some people may be aware that they should get treatment at no costs, as they have already contributed to the public health care by paying health insurance premiums or through taxes and that the law guarantees access to health care as a right. Moreover, they may also feel that they contribute far more than they actually benefit from the treatments or visits. Therefore it is feasible to assume that the data can be better described by a model that accounts for self-selection.
The possible selection bias may be a classical case where the selection and the outcomes are determined by different probability functions. This is a two part model where the first part is a binary outcome, modeled as the probability that the binary variable is bigger than 0, and the second part uses a linear regression to model the outcome if the outcome is bigger than 0. The Heckman selection model is used to check whether there exists any potential biases in the selection of respondents who do pay and for whom we observe positive values on informal payments. This model is supposed to capture the overall effect that certain observable characteristics may have on the selection of respondents who pay informally. This is a very important aspect if we want to avoid any biases associated with the estimates from the tobit model.
Results from the two models are compared with each other to check for inconsistencies.
Impact over the years
Evaluating the between-years changes in individual informal payments for health care requires a panel survey that follows the same individuals over the years and experimental set up, where we would be able to construct counterfactuals. After these counterfactuals are identified we can use them to observe the changes over the years for those paying informal payments and those not paying. This would capture the real change over the years not for the total population but for people having similar characteristics and therefore produce more accurate estimates. Thus, PSM creates a situation similar to an experiment where everyone has the same probability of participating in the consecutive year, and this probability is balanced among the participants and not participants and conditional on observed variables.
We assume i y 1 to be the participation outcome for individual i when this individual is subject to participating in the current and previous survey and i y 0 to be the outcome in absence of the participation for the same individual (see also Deheija and Wahba, 2002; Dabalen et al., 2008) . The effect for an individual is:
and population effect can therefore be defined as:
whereT indicates the participation in the survey, and i T is equal to 1 if individual i participates in the survey and 0 if not. As the "treatment" here refers to the consecutive year of the survey we do not observe outcomes that would have materialized if corresponding individuals had not participated in the survey
. In our case the "treatment" involves the entire population and therefore the participation is independent of the potential outcomes
. The average participation effect for the population participating is:
The variables used for matching correspond to observable characteristics of individuals that are stable over the years. The random selection of participants in the surveys makes sure that the qualities of the participants and the non participants are identical in terms of the distribution of the observed characteristics. Given that all surveys were country representative, we can assume that individuals had the same probability of participating in the consecutive surveys, and that both participants and not participants came from the same economic environment. Both the condition of random selection of participants and the similarities in the background (Heckman et al., 1997) are fulfilled in our analysis. Table 4 gives the results of tobit and Heckman selection models for the amounts paid informally for both outpatient and inpatient care. The exclusion instruments used for non-random assignment of systematic non-payers (patients who will not pay an informal payment under the given circumstances) are the dummies corresponding to having health insurance, having difficulties to pay for health care, and being a health practitioner (as the profession of the patient). These instruments are chosen as they are related to the probability of paying informally, but not to the amount paid. The overidentifying restriction tests (Sargan, 1958; Basmann, 1960) indicate whether the exclusion instruments fulfill the requirement of being exogenous to the amount paid informally (while correlated with the probability of paying). The outcomes of the tests do not reject the null hypothesis (the lower part of Table 3 ). This suggests that our exclusion instruments can be considered valid. At the same time we also test for the validity of the selection correction. The likelihood-ratio test for rho=0 rejects its null hypothesis showing that OLS estimates without the selection correction would be inconsistent.
V. Results
As we can see, the effects of individual characteri sti cs on the am ount paid informally (expressed here as the natural logarithm) vary slightly across the tobit and Residents of rural areas pay higher amounts of informal payments for outpatient care compared to residents of urban areas. The selection correction shows that such difference is statistically significant only for the amount paid and negative (not statistically significant) for the probability of paying. This shows that patients coming from rural areas are less likely to pay (for every patient from rural area the logs of paying informally decrease by 0.3 percent times compared to urban area patients), but pay in general higher amounts. Such differences can be a result of a mix of visits in health care centers located in rural or urban areas. Due to social connections they are less likely to pay informally in their own localities (Vian and Burak, 2006) , but pay higher amounts in urban areas where such network connections are lacking and higher opportunity costs are involved (e.g. higher transportation costs, staying over, etc). The situation is different for inpatient care where being a rural resident does not have a statistical significant effect on the amount paid informally for inpatient care. This is evidence that the amounts paid informally in inpatient care do not differ significantly between patients living in rural or urban areas. The results of the geographic divisions (stratums) show that there are significant regional differences in paying informally to medical staff. The results from the tobit and Heckman selection models differ at this point. Residents of coastal areas seem to be more likely to pay informally to medical staff for both outpatient and inpatient care compared to others areas but they pay lower amounts (after the selection correction).
On the other hand, residents of mountainous areas and Tirana are less likely to pay informally compared to residents of coastal and central areas. This difference may be due to the fact that mountainous areas and Tirana are on average poorer than central and coastal areas (World Bank, 2006) .
Older people are faced with higher informal payments for outpatient and inpatient care. This is related to the higher predisposition of requiring health care
(older people have a higher demand for health care). The negative slope of the age squared variable indicates an inverted-U shape of the amount paid informally to age.
This shows that working-age adults are the ones who pay larger amounts informally and this can be linked to their higher income generating capabilities and higher opportunity costs. As expected, patients in the higher consumption quintiles generally spend more on informal payments for both health care services. However, coefficients are not always statistically significant showing that differences between quintiles are not clearly marked. For instance for outpatient service the selection correction shows that patients in quintile 1 may have a lower probability of paying but pay (for every patient from rural area the logs of paying informally decrease by 0.3 percent times compared to urban area patients) larger amounts than higher quintiles (though results are not statistically significant), or that quintile 4 may pay lower amounts than respondents from lower quintiles (the coefficient for the logarithm of amount paid is negative but again not statistically significant). This shows that informal payments do not follow the trend of the income distribution and that the lowest quintiles are the most disadvantaged ones.
Health insurance is among the identifying instruments in the selection equation.
As we have shown the major contribution of health insurance is that it lowers the probability of paying informally for outpatient and inpatient care (this also explains its significance in the tobit model) but does less so for the amount paid. The matching results reported in Table 5 show that there were no big differences patients coming from other regions become less likely to pay informally (though differences are not always significant). These between-areas differences could be a consequence of more resources being allocated to certain geographical areas (e.g.
higher salaries for medical staff willing to work in remote hospitals, etc). 
VI. Discussion
By using the results for inpatient and outpatient care, we are able to say something about the causes of informal payments in Albania. The high incidences of informal payments among certain groups of payers (e.g. rural residents, lower educated patients, and those with difficulties to pay for health care) shows how wide spread this phenomena is. The significant effects of having less information on the amount required (as with patients with basic or no education) or having fewer social connections (as with rural residents seeking health care in urban areas) clearly indicate a governance failure in the system and demonstrate that not all causal factors are exclusively linked to scarcity of resources. Moreover, certain groups in the population seem to be more disadvantaged than others. Patients belonging to the lower consumption quintiles pay similar amounts compared to the middle quintile, while rural residents pay higher amounts for outpatient care. This shows that they are very vulnerable to informal payments. The government fails to protect these groups in the population that are left to cope with market mechanisms (You need care? You have to pay for it!). It is clear that lack of government support and a lower bargaining power of these groups will make them more susceptible to poverty in the long-run.
Having national health insurance lowers the probability of paying informally both for outpatient and inpatient care. This may be due to the greater bargaining pay. This is evidence for some debatable effects of the reform measures and clearly indicates that weak governance remains one of the biggest challenges in the sector.
Previous research has highlighted government failure as one of the main causes for informal payments in health care (Lewis, 2006) . When the government fails to enforce accountability or fails to prevent non-ethical behavior of medical staff, the most vulnerable will bear the consequences. Our findings show that in the Albanian context one of the main reforms directly linked with the underpaid health care staff (the increase of GPs wages), has proven ineffective in reducing informal payments in the long run. This was due to lack of a follow up on reforms and the indexation of wages over the years. The evidence shows that even though economic factors may play a role in determining the amount of informal payments to medical staff, governance issues are more closely linked to the incidence of such payments.
VII. Conclusion
Informal payments to medical staff are widespread in Albania both for outpatient residents of rural areas). Providing better protection for the most vulnerable groups of the population and adjusting the regional distribution of resources will certainly help in this direction. Moreover, every extension of health insurance to inpatient care must be combined with policy measures to protect the chronically ill and the uninsured. It goes without saying that the increased efficiency in financing the health care system would also require taking measures to eliminate informal payments. Experiences from other countries (see also Lewis and Pettersson, 2009 ) have shown that providing more incentives for physicians (e.g. revenue sharing) and increasing control and accountability would contribute in this regard.
